DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 203

Accident time: not recorded **Accident Date: 05/05/1993**

Where it occurred: Route 56, Kravanh Country: Cambodia

> District, Pursat Province

inadequacy (?)

Primary cause: Field control Secondary cause: Field control

inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none Name of source: HT (field)

Organisation: Name removed

Mine/device: Type 72 AP blast Ground condition: not recorded

Date record created: 15/02/2004 Date last modified: 15/02/2004

No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude: Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Coordinates fixed by:

> Map east: Map north:

Map scale: not recorded Map series:

Map edition: Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)

no independent investigation available (?)

Accident report

No accident report was found on record at the country MAC, possibly because the accident occurred before the country MAC formally existed. The accident was mentioned on the demining group's own spreadsheet of incidents they had suffered in the country. However, the country office did not have a copy of their own internal accident report. Their spreadsheet recorded the mine type and summarised the injuries.

The classification of this accident has been made by inference from the injuries.

Victim Report

Victim number: 260 Name: Name removed

Age: Gender: Male

Status: deminer Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: not recorded

Summary of injuries:

AMPUTATION/LOSS

Leg Below knee

COMMENT

No medical report was made available.

Analysis

The primary cause of the accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because it seems likely that the victim either stepped on a mine that had been missed during clearance or walked into an uncleared area. Adequate field controls should have prevented both.

The demining group's field office did not have any detail of this accident. Access by the researcher to the group's field operations (where long-serving staff could have been questioned) was denied because their expatriate supervisor was out of the country.

In 1999, the demining group's UK head office claimed not to keep copies of field incidents. This is known to be untrue. The UK management's unwillingness to share data openly could be taken to imply that they sought to conceal things. Its field staff have usually shared the information that is available to them.